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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the response of hours worked and real wages to fiscal policy shocks in the
U.S. during the post World War II era. We identify these shocks with exogenous changes in military
purchases and argue that they lead to a persistent increase in government purchases and tax rates on
capital and labor income, and a persistent rise in aggregate hours worked as well as declines in real
wages. The shocks are also associated with short lived rises in aggregate investment and small
movements in private consumption. We describe and implement a methodology for assessing
whether standard neoclassical models can account for the consequences of a fiscal policy shock.
Simple versions of the neoclassical model can account for the qualitative effects of a fiscal shock.
Once we allow for habit formation and investment adjustment costs, the model can also account
reasonably well for the quantitative effects of a fiscal shock.
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This paper investigates the response of hours worked and real wages to ﬁscal
policy shocks in the U.S. during the post World War II era. We identify these
shocks with exogenous changes in military purchases and argue that they lead
to a persistent increase in government purchases and tax rates on capital and
labor income, and a persistent rise in aggregate hours worked as well as declines
in real wages. The shocks are also associated with short lived rises in aggregate
investment and small movements in private consumption.
The basic question that we address is whether standard neoclassical models
can account for the response of hours worked and real wages to a ﬁscal policy
shock. If taxes were lump sum in nature, the answer would be unambiguously
y e s . T h en e g a t i v ei n c o m ee ﬀect associated with a rise in government purchases
would increase the aggregate supply of hours worked. With diminishing marginal
productivity to labor, we would observe a rise in hours worked along with a decline
in real wages.1
But taxes are not lump sum in nature and, according to our results, distor-
tionary taxes rise in response to increases in government purchases. In neoclassical
models, the consequences of a ﬁscal policy shock depend on how increases in gov-
ernment purchases are ﬁnanced. Taken together these observations imply that
analyses based on the lump sum tax assumption may yield misleading results.2
Baxter and King (1993) forcefully demonstrate this point. Using a neoclassical
model, they show that when an increase in government purchases is ﬁnanced by
lump sum taxes, hours worked rise and real wages fall. But when the increase
in government purchases is ﬁnanced entirely by distortionary income taxes, both
1See Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) for quantitative
analyses of the consequences of an increase in government purchases in real business cycle models
when all taxes are lump sum. Also see Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Devereux, Head and
Lapham (1996) for similar analyses of models embodying imperfect competition and increasing
returns to scale.
2See Braun (1994), McGrattan (1994) and Jones (2000) for analyses of the eﬀects of shocks
to government purchases and tax rates in a business cycle context.
2hours worked and after-tax real wages fall.3 In a similar vein, Mulligan’s (1998)
argument that neoclassical models cannot account for the rise in U.S. employment
during WWII rests critically on the observation that marginal income tax rates
rose dramatically.4
Yet many analyses of U.S. ﬁscal policy in the post war era assume that in-
creases in government purchases are entirely ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes.5 The
results in Baxter and King (1993) and Mulligan (1998) suggest that this assump-
tion may give rise to misleading results. The only way to know is to confront
models with an experiment that is commensurate with what occurred in the data.
That is what we try to do in this paper. Both the World War II experiment and
the post-war experiments that we identify involved a rise in tax rates and in
government purchases.
The key empirical problem is identifying exogenous changes in ﬁscal policy.
The literature has pursued various approaches.6 We build on the approach used
by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) who focus on changes associated with exogenous
movements in defense spending. To isolate such movements, they identify three
political events, arguably unrelated to developments in the domestic U.S. economy,
that led to large military buildups. We refer to these events as ‘Ramey-Shapiro
episodes’.
We analyze the performance of two versions of the neoclassical model. The
ﬁrst, which we refer to as the benchmark model, corresponds to a standard growth
model. The second extends the benchmark model to allow for habit formation
and investment adjustment costs. We refer to the resulting model as the modiﬁed
3In related work Ohanian (1997) analyzes the welfare consequences of the diﬀerent tax policies
pursued in the U.S. during World War II and Korea.
4M c G r a t t a na n dO h a n i a n( 1999) take issue with Mulligan’s conclusion and argue that rea-
sonable perturbations to the neoclassical model render it consistent with World War II data.
5See for example Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Devereaux, Head and Lapham (1996),
Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999), Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1992).
6See Blanchard and Perotti (1998), Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum
and Fisher (1999) for discussions of alternative approaches.
3benchmark model. Our main results with respect to the benchmark model can be
summarized as follows. First, the model can account for the qualitative eﬀects of a
ﬁscal shock on both hours worked and real wages. Even after taking into account
the rise in tax rates, the model implies that a rise in government purchases leads
to a boom in hours worked and a fall in real wages. Second, the benchmark model
can also account for the qualitative responses of investment and consumption: the
former rises and the latter falls.
Third, in the benchmark model, the primary impact of distortionary tax rates
i so nt h et i m i n go fh o wh o u r sw o r k e dr e s p o n d st ot h es h o c k .I nt h ed a t aaﬁscal
policy shock leads to hump-shaped rises in tax rates, government purchases and
hours worked. When all taxes are lump sum, the model is able to reproduce this
basic pattern. Allowing for movements in distortionary taxes shifts the rise in
employment counterfactually, closer to the time of the ﬁscal shock. Indeed the
peak response of hours worked occurs at the time of the shock.
The intuition for this result can be described as follows. In the data, a ﬁscal
policy shock leads to highly correlated hump-shaped movements in labor income
tax rates and government purchases. A rise in government purchases raises the
present value of agents’ taxes, thus triggering an increase in aggregate labor sup-
ply. A hump-shaped rise in tax rates has both intratemporal and intertemporal
substitution eﬀects on labor supply. Once these substitution eﬀects are taken into
account, simple neoclassical models counterfactually predict that, after a ﬁscal
policy shock, hours worked respond most strongly initially, before labor income
tax rates begin to rise. The mismatch between model and data is worse the more
elastic labor supply is assumed to be.
Fourth, the benchmark model can account quantitatively for the average in-
crease in hours worked and the overall volatility of hours worked in response to a
ﬁscal shock. But the ability to do so depends on the assumption that labor supply
is quite elastic, say of the magnitude assumed in typical real business cycle models.
Fifth, the benchmark model does quite well at accounting quantitatively for the
dynamic response of real wages. Sixth, the benchmark model can account for the
4qualitative response of consumption and investment to a ﬁscal policy shock. Both
in the data and in the model, a ﬁscal shock leads to a fall in consumption and a
rise in investment. But the benchmark model does a poor of accounting for the
quantitative responses of consumption and investment. Basically this is because
it substantially overstates the decline in consumption and the rise in investment
that follow in the wake of a ﬁscal policy shock. These shortcomings are serious
because they cast doubt on the mechanism by which hours worked and real wages
respond in the benchmark model.
We argue that the quantitative shortcomings of the benchmark model can be
substantially improved upon by allowing for habit formation and investment ad-
justment costs. Numerous authors have argued that allowing for these features of
preferences and technology improves the ability of neoclassical models to account
for various features of post World War II business cycles.7 We show that these
modiﬁcations considerably improve the performance of those models in our con-
text as well. Habit formation in consumption mutes the fall in consumption that
occurs in the benchmark model. While the decline in consumption is still large,
the model based impulse response function lies within the conﬁdence intervals of
the estimated impulse response function. Investment adjustment costs induce a
hump shaped response of investment and generate a sympathetic hump shaped
response of hours worked. Consequently, this version of the model can account
for the timing of how hours worked responds to a ﬁs c a lp o l i c ys h o c k ,e v e ni nt h e
face of movements in distortionary tax rates.
Overall we ﬁnd relatively little formal evidence against the modiﬁed bench-
mark model, at least for the hypotheses that we consider. To the extent that
it has important shortcomings these pertain to the behavior of consumption and
the model’s reliance on an elasticity of labor supply that is high relative to ex-
isting micro evidence. These problems notwithstanding, we conclude that the
modiﬁed benchmark model does a reasonably good job at accounting for both the
7See for example Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2001) and the references therein.
5qualitative and quantitative eﬀects of a shock to ﬁscal policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
evidence on the eﬀects of a ﬁscal shock. Section 3 discusses a limited information
strategy for assessing the implications of a model for the consequences of a ﬁscal
shock. Section 4 reports the results of implementing this strategy on the bench-
mark and modiﬁed benchmark neoclassical models. Section 5 contains concluding
remarks.
2. Evidence on the Eﬀects of a Shock to Fiscal Policy
In this section we describe our strategy for estimating the eﬀects of an exogenous
shock to ﬁscal policy and present our results.
2.1. Identifying the Eﬀects of a Fiscal Policy Shock
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) pursue a ‘narrative approach’ to isolate three arguably
exogenous events that led to large military buildups and increases in total gov-
ernment purchases: the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Carter-Reagan
defense buildup. Based on their reading of history, they date these events at
1950:3, 1965:1 and 1980:1. The weakness of this approach is that they only iden-
tify three episodes of exogenous shocks to ﬁscal policy. In our view this weakness
is more than oﬀset by the compelling nature of their assumption that the war
episodes are exogenous. Certainly their assumption seems plausible relative to
the assumptions required to isolate the exogenous component of statistical inno-
vations in government purchases and tax rates. See Edelberg, Eichenbaum and
Fisher (1999) for further discussion.
To estimate the impact of exogenous movements in government purchases,
Gt, capital and labor income tax rates, τkt and τnt, on the economy, we use the
following procedure. Suppose that Gt, τkt and τnt are elements of the vector
6stochastic process Zt. Deﬁne the three dummy variables Dit, i = 1,2,3, where
Dit =
(
1, if t = di
0, otherwise






We assume that Zt evolves according to:
Zt = A0 + A1t + A2(t ≥ 1973 : 2) + A3(L)Zt−1 +
3 X
i=1
A4(L)ψiDit + ut, (1)





0, for all s 6=0
Σ, for s =0 ,
Σ is a positive deﬁnite matrix of dimension equal to the number of elements in
Zt, t denotes time, and Aj(L), j =3 ,4a r eﬁnite ordered vector polynomials in
nonnegative powers of the lag operator L. As in Ramey and Shapiro (1998) we
allow for a trend break in 1973:2.8
The ψi in (1) are scalars with ψ1 normalized to unity. The parameters ψ2
and ψ3 measure the intensity of the second and third Ramey-Shapiro episodes
relative to the ﬁrst. This speciﬁcation allows us to depart from the assumption in
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) that the
ﬁscal episodes under investigation are of equal intensity, i.e. ψi = 1, i = 1,2,3.
Relation (1)i m p l i e st h a tw h i l et h eﬁscal episodes may diﬀer in intensity, their
dynamic eﬀects are the same, up to a scale factor, ψi. While arguable, this
assumption is consistent with the maintained assumptions in Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). It is also consistent with the
assumptions in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) who identify an exogenous shock
to government purchases with the innovation to defense purchases estimated from
a linear time invariant vector autoregressive representation of the data.
8In practice we found that our results were robust to not allowing for a break in trend, i.e.
to setting A2 =0 .
7We estimated (1) by maximum likelihood assuming a Gaussian likelihood func-
tion. A consistent estimate of the response of Zit+k,t h eith element of Z at time
t+k,t ot h eo n s e to ft h eith Ramey-Shapiro episode is given by an estimate of the
coeﬃcient on Lk in the expansion of ψi [I − A3(L)L]
−1 A4(L).
2.2. Empirical Results
In this subsection we present the results of implementing the procedure discussed
above. In deciding how to specify Zt we must deal with the following trade-oﬀ.
On the one hand, we would like, in principle, to include all of the variables in
our analysis in one large unconstrained VAR and report the implied system of
dynamic response functions. The disadvantage of this strategy is that it requires
estimating a large number of parameters simultaneously. On the other hand, if we
include too few variables in the VAR, then we would encounter signiﬁcant omitted
variable bias. In light of these considerations, we chose the following intermediate
strategy. In all cases our speciﬁcation of Zt includes the log of time t per-capita
real GDP, the log of per-capita real government purchases and average capital
and labor income tax rates. To estimate the eﬀect of a ﬁscal policy shock on
some other variable, we add it to the list of variables in Zt. The variables that
we consider include the log of per-capita hours worked, the log of after-tax real
wages, the log of per capita consumption and the log of per capita investment.
Note that in all cases, Zt, includes only variables that also are included in the
model that we study below. We assume that Zt depends on six lagged values
of itself, i.e. A3(L) is a sixth order polynomial in L. This lag length was chosen
using the modiﬁed likelihood ratio test described in Sims (1980). All estimates
are based on quarterly data from 1947:1 to 1995:4. The Appendix describes the
data used in our analysis.
Column 1 of Figure 1 displays the log of real defense expenditures and the
share of real government purchases in GDP, along with vertical lines at the dates
of Ramey-Shapiro episodes. The time series on real defense expenditures is dom-
inated by three events: the large increases in real defense expenditures associated
8with the Korean war, the Vietnam war and the Carter-Reagan defense buildup.
The Ramey-Shapiro dates essentially mark the beginning of these episodes. In
the models that we explore it is total government purchases, rather than military
purchases that is relevant. Figure 1 shows that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes also
coincide with rises in real government purchases.
The second column of Figure 1 displays our measure of capital and labor
income tax rates, along with vertical lines at the Ramey-Shapiro dates. These
tax rate measures were constructed using quarterly data from the national income
and products accounts using the method employed by Jones (2002).9 Note that
labor tax rates rise substantially after all three Ramey-Shapiro dates while capital
tax rates rise after the ﬁrst two episodes. These observations suggest the potential
importance of taking into account movements in tax rates when evaluating the
macroeconomic eﬀects of an increase in government spending.
Recall that we normalize the ﬁrst episode (Korea) to be of unit intensity. Our
point estimates of the intensities of the second and third episodes are equal to
0.08 and 0.12, respectively.10 Below we report the dynamic response function of
various aggregates to an episode of unit intensity. This simply scales the size of
the impulse response functions.
Column 1 of Figure 2 reports the dynamic responses of real government pur-
chases and output to a ﬁscal shock.11 The solid lines display point estimates while
the dashed lines correspond to 95% conﬁdence interval bands.12 As can be seen,
9This method is closely related to the approach of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) and is
similar to the procedures used in Joines (1981) and McGrattan (1994). The main diﬀerence be-
tween Jones and Joines and McGrattan is that the Joines and McGrattan estimate the personal
income tax rate as a marginal tax rate from tax records, rather than as an average rate from
the national accounts. See Jones (2002) for a detailed comparison of his tax rate measures and
those of Joines (1981) and McGrattan (1994).
10The associated 95% conﬁdence intervals are (0.001,0.17) and (0.04,0.19), respectively.
These were computed imposing the restriction that intensities had to be nonnegative.
11With two exceptions, the impulse response functions are reported as percentage deviations
from a variable’s unshocked path. The exceptions are the impulse response functions of labor
and capital tax rates (Figure 2), which are reported as deviations from their unshocked levels,
measured in percentage points.
12These were computed using the bootstrap Monte Carlo procedure described in Edelberg,
9the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode leads to large, persistent, hump-shaped
rises in total government purchases and output.13 Column 2 of Figure 2 displays
the dynamic response of capital and labor tax rates to a ﬁscal policy shock. Four
results are worth noting. First, the labor tax rate rises in a hump-shaped pattern,
mirroring the dynamic response of government purchases, with the peak occurring
about two years after the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode. Second, the maximal
rise in the labor tax rate is roughly 2.7 percentage points after nine quarters. This
represents a rise of about 27% in the tax rate relative to its value in 1949. Third,
the capital tax rate also rises in a hump-shaped manner, but the maximal rise
occurs before the peak rises in government purchases and labor tax rates. Fourth,
the rise in the capital tax rates is large, with the maximal rise of 11.0 percentage
points occurring after three quarters.
The third row of Figure 2 reports the response of hours worked and after-tax
real wages to the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode. A number of interesting
results emerge. First, paralleling the response of total government purchases,
hours worked display a delayed hump-shaped response. The peak response in
hours worked is roughly 9.7% and occurs about 10 quarters after the onset of a
Ramey-Shapiro episode.14 Second, after-tax real wages fall after the ﬁscal shock,
with a peak decline of 7.5% roughly 9 quarters after the shock.
Finally, to help assess our model, the last row of Figure 2 reports the response
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). The Monte Carlo methods that we used to quantify the im-
portance of sampling uncertainty do not convey any information about ‘date’ uncertainty. This
is because they take as given the Ramey and Shapiro dates. One simple way to assess the
importance of date uncertainty is to redo the analysis perturbing the Ramey and Shapiro dates.
Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) document the robustness of inferences under the as-
sumption that the diﬀerent episodes are of equal intensity.
13Working with an equal intensity speciﬁcation (ψi = 1, i = 1,2,3) Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) show that the response of real defense purchases is larger in size but similar in shape
to the response of total government purchases. This is still the case here where we allow the
Ramey-Shapiro episodes to be of diﬀerent intensities.
14See Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) for the re-
sponses of real GDP and various other measures of hours worked obtained under the assump-
tion that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes are of equal intensity. The qualitative nature of these
r e s p o n s e si su n a ﬀected by allowing for diﬀerent intensities.
10of consumption and investment to the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode. Notice
that consumption does not respond strongly to the ﬁscal policy shock. At the
same time investment rises by about 10% in the ﬁrst period of the shock and then
quickly declines to its pre shock level. In both cases there is substantial sampling
uncertainty. Still, as discussed below, these responses are useful in evaluating the
ability of the neoclassical model to account for the aﬀects of a ﬁscal policy shock.
In sum, a Ramey-Shapiro episode is marked by a statistically signiﬁcant rise
in purchases, output, hours, tax rates and investment as well as a fall in after-tax
real wage rates. These results are consistent with the features of the World War
II episode emphasized by Mulligan (1998) and McGrattan and Ohanian (1999).
3. A Model Based Experiment
In the previous section, we displayed our estimates of the dynamic consequences
of a ﬁscal policy shock. In this section we discuss a procedure for assessing the
ability of our model to account for the eﬀects of such a shock. The basic idea
is to subject the model economy to the same experiment that we claim to have
isolated in the data. Speciﬁcally, beginning from the nonstochastic steady state
of a model economy, we imagine that agents are confronted with a sequence of
changes in government purchases and tax rates equal to our point estimates of
the changes following a Ramey - Shapiro episode. We then compare the response
of variables in the model economy to our estimates of how the U.S. economy
responded to the same experiment.
Deﬁne Dt = ψiDit. Also, let θ be a vector containing every parameter of the
representation for Zt given by (1). We partition Zt as Zt =(z0
t f0
t )0,w h e r ezt is
a3× 1 vector whose elements consist of model variables, excluding the measures
of ﬁscal policy. The vector ft contains the ﬁscal policy variables: the log of per
capita real government purchases and average capital and labor income tax rates.
Multiplying (1)b y[ I−A3(L)]−1 we can express zt and ft as a moving averages
11of ut and Dt:
zt = πz(L)ut + hz(L)Dt (2)
ft = πf(L)ut + hf(L)Dt, (3)
where ut is deﬁned in (1), and πz(L), πf(L),h z(L)a n dhf(L) are square summable
non-negative polynomials in the lag operator L. For simplicity here we have ab-
stracted from constants and trends. The polynomials in (2) and (3) are implicitly
functions of θ and we will, on occasion, make this dependence explicit.







where kt is the capital stock at time t. In addition κk and κf are 1 × 4a n d3× 4
matrices. The path of kt can be written as






Here ρ is a scalar and the µj’s are 3 × 1 matrices. The parameters κk, κf, ρ,
and {µj}
+∞
j=−∞ depend only on the model parameters describing preferences and
technology, not on the parameters governing the law of motion of ft.
There are two ways to measure the dynamic responses of zt to the onset
of a Ramey-Shapiro episode. First, we can infer these responses directly from
hz(L) in (2). That is, we can write the impulse response function ID(i + 1;θ)=
∂Etzt+i/∂Dt = hzi where hzi is the coeﬃcient on Liin hz(L). Since ID(i + 1;θ)
is computed using a statistical representation of Zt, w er e f e rt oi ta st h edata
response function.
Second, we can use the economic model in conjunction with the estimated
moving average representation for ft to compute an alternative response function.



































= hfi, for i ≥ 0. (8)





























fhfi for i ≥ 1.
deﬁnes an alternative impulse response function IM(i + 1,θ). We refer to this as
the model response function.
Notice that both response functions, ID and IM, depend on the parameters of
representation (1), θ. However, only IM depends on the parameters of preferences
and technology in the neoclassical model. Under the null that the model is true,
ID and IM are the same. To test the model we could simply test whether ID
and IM were identical for all i. Rather than do this, we focus on whether speciﬁc
features of the two response functions are the same.
To give a concrete example, in Section 4 we will examine the average response
of hours worked in the ﬁrst four periods after the onset of a Ramey and Shapiro












where the subscript n simply indicates the elements of ID and IM that correspond
to the response of hours worked. If the model is true, then the hypothesis g(θ)=0
ought to hold. To test this hypothesis, we ﬁr s tc o m p u t ea ne s t i m a t eo fg(θ),
denoted g(ˆ θ), by (i) obtaining an estimating, ˆ θ, of the parameters of representation
(1), (ii) computing ID(i + 1,ˆ θ), (iii) calibrating the model parameters and (iv)
13computing IM(i + 1,ˆ θ). We then test whether g(ˆ θ)i ss i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from
0. To do this we exploit a result from Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1984):
the test statistic




−1g(b θ)( 9 )
is asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of free-
dom, if
√
T d Var[g(b θ)] is a consistent estimator of Var[
√
Tg(b θ)].15
Our test takes the sampling uncertainty in ˆ θ into account. Strictly speaking,
we should also take sampling uncertainty in the model parameters into account.
However, results in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) suggest that this source of
uncertainty is unlikely to signiﬁcantly aﬀect inference for the model we discuss in
this paper.16
In sum, this section provides a rationale for our procedure for assessing whether
the neoclassical model can account for the estimated response of the U.S. economy
to an exogenous ﬁscal policy shock. A key step in this analysis was to attribute
views to agents about how ﬁscal policy evolves after the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro
episode. These views are summarized by (3).
Implicit in our analysis is the assumption that at any date t,a g e n t se x p e c t
Dt+j, j>0, to be zero. In addition, we assume that a realization of Dt = 1
does not aﬀect agents’ future expectations of Dt, i.e. they continue to expect
15In practice we computed our test statistic using the bootstrap procedure described in Edel-
berg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999). Speciﬁcally, let θi be the point estimate of θ generated
by the ith bootstrap draw, i = 1, ..., N,w h e r eN = 500. Deﬁne ¯ g =( 1/N)
PN
i=1 g(θi). Then






[g(θi) − ¯ g][g(θi) − ¯ g]0.
16Burnside and Eichenbaum calculate conﬁdence intervals for the dynamic response functions
in a standard real business cycle model to a shock in government purchases. They argue that the
size of the conﬁdence intervals is determined primarily by sampling uncertainty regarding the
law of motion for government purchases, rather than the other parameters of the models, at least
when the latter are estimated using the generalized method of moment techniques employed in
Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996).
14that future values of Dt will equal zero. So from their perspective, a realization of
Dt = 1 is just like the realization of an i.i.d exogenous shock to ft.B u to n c es u c ha
shock occurs, the expected response of ft+j is given by the coeﬃcient on Lj in the
polynomial hf(L). An alternative approach would be to model agents’ subjective
probability distribution over rare events such as the outbreaks of war and major
military buildups induced by exogenous shocks. We adopted our approach given
the diﬃculty of this task and the paucity of data on such events.
4. Fiscal Policy in a Neoclassical Model
In this section we describe a neoclassical model and study its implications for how
the economy responds to a ﬁscal policy shock. The model incorporates adjustment
costs to investment and habit formation. While these do not aﬀect its qualitative
properties, they lead to a considerable improvement of the model’s quantitative
properties. The section is divided into three parts. The ﬁrst subsection describes
our theoretical framework, the second subsection describes the way we calibrated
the model’s parameters and the third subsection discusses the model’s quantitative
properties.
4.1. Theoretical Framework












t = Ct − bCt−1,b ≥ 0( 11)
V (1 − nt)=
( 1
1−µ(1 − nt)1−µ,µ ≥ 0
ln(1 − nt),µ = 1
. (12)
Here E0 is the time 0 conditional expectations operator, β is a subjective discount
factor between 0 and 1, while Ct and nt denote time t consumption and the fraction
15of the household’s time endowment devoted to work, respectively. When b>0,
(10) allows for habit formation in consumption. Given (12), the representative
household’s Frisch elasticity of labor supply, evaluated at the steady state level of
hours, n,i se q u a lt o( 1 − n)/(nµ).17
The household owns the stock of capital, whose value at the beginning of time
t we denote by Kt. Absent adjustment costs, capital evolves according to:
Kt+1 =( 1 − δ)Kt + It, 0 < δ < 1, (13)
where It denotes time t investment in capital. We also consider a version of the
model in which there are costs of adjusting investment. There are various ways
to model these costs. Here we proceed as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2001) and suppose that Kt+1 evolves according to
Kt+1 =( 1 − δ)Kt + F(It,I t−1)( 14)
where






Notice that the functional form for F in (15) penalizes changes in It. Many au-
thors in the literature adopt speciﬁcations which penalize the level of investment.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) argue that it is diﬃcult to generate
hump shaped responses of investment to shocks with the latter speciﬁcation. In
contrast, hump shaped responses of investment emerge naturally with speciﬁca-
tion (15). As we show below, this improves the performance of the model by
inducing a sympathetic hump shape in hours worked.18
17For µ =0 , this elasticity must be interpreted with some care. Hansen (1985) and Rogerson
(1988) describe model economies in which the competitive equilibrium allocation is given by the
solution to a social planning problem in which leisure enters into the planner’s objective function
in a linear manner (µ = 0) - even though leisure need not enter individual agents’ objective
function linearly. So in their model, there is no link between individuals’ Frisch elasticity of
labor supply and the corresponding elasticity implied by the planner’s preferences.
18See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) for a more detailed comparison of the two
cost of adjustment speciﬁctions.
16We restrict the function, S, to satisfy the following properties: S(1)=S0(1)=
0, and s ≡ S00(1) > 0. Under our assumptions, in a nonstochastic steady state
F1 = 1,F 2 =0 . The steady state values of the variables are not a function of the
adjustment cost parameter, s. Of course, the dynamics of the model are inﬂuenced
by s. When s = 0 the model is equivalent to one without adjustment costs. Given
our solution procedure no other features of the S function need to be speciﬁed.
The household rents out capital and supplies labor in perfectly competitive
spot factor markets. We denote the real wage rate per unit of labor by wt and
the real rental rate on capital by rt. The government taxes rental income net of
depreciation, and wage income at the rates τkt and τnt, respectively. Consequently,
after-tax real wage and rental rate on capital are given by (1 − τnt)Wt and (1 −
τkt)rt + δτkt, respectively. Therefore, the household’s time t budget constraint is
given by
Ct + It ≤ (1 − τnt)Wtnt +( 1 − τkt)rtKt + δτktKt − Φt (16)
where Φt denotes lump sum taxes paid by the household.




1−α, 0 < α < 1. (17)
The ﬁrm sells its output in a perfectly competitive goods market and rents labor
and capital in perfectly competitive spot markets.
The government purchases Gt units of output at time t. For simplicity we
assume the government balances its budget every period. Government purchases
are ﬁnanced by capital taxes, labor taxes and lump sum taxes, Φt.C o n s e q u e n t l y
the government’s budget constraint is given by
Gt = τntWtnt + τkt(rt − δ)Kt + Φt.
Given our assumptions, Ricardian equivalence holds with respect to the timing
of lump sum taxes.20 So we could allow the government to borrow part of the
19To conserve on notation we abstract from growth when describing the model. In practice
we allow for growth arising from technological progress when calibrating the model.
20This assumes the absence of distortionary taxes on government debt.
17diﬀerence between its expenditures and revenues raised from distortionary taxes,
subject to its intertemporal budget constraint, and it would not aﬀect our results.
The vector ft =[ l o g ( Gt),τkt,τnt]
0 evolves according to
ft = f + hf(L)εt. (18)
Here εt is a zero mean, iid scalar random variable that is orthogonal to all model
variables dated time t − 1 and earlier. In addition hf(L)=[ h1(L),h 2(L),h 3(L)]0
where hi(L),i= 1,2,3i saqth ordered polynomial in nonnegative powers of the lag
operator L,a n df denotes the steady state value of ft. Note that εt is common to
both government spending and taxes. This formalizes the notion that government
spending and taxes respond simultaneously to a common ﬁscal shock.
The problem of the representative household is to maximize (10) subject to
(16), (12), (14), (11), (18) and a given stochastic process for wage and rental
rates. The maximization is by choice of contingency plans for {Ct,K t+1,nt} over
the elements of the household’s time t information set that includes all model
variables dated time t and earlier.
The ﬁrm’s problem is to maximize time t proﬁts. Its ﬁrst order conditions
imply
Wt =( 1 − α)(Kt/nt)
α , and (19)
rt = α(nt/Kt)
1−α .
We use the log-linearization procedure described by Christiano (1998) to solve
for the competitive equilibrium of this economy. To conserve on notation we
abstracted from growth when presenting our model. However we do allow for
growth when calibrating the model. Speciﬁcally we assume that total factor pro-





This model of growth is inconsistent with the way we treated growth in section
2 where we assume a trend break in 1973:2. To understand the nature of the
approximation involved, note that Christiano’s solution procedure involves taking
18a log linear approximation about the model’s steady state. Suppose that the break
in trend is unanticipated and the model has converged to its stochastic steady
state by the time of the third Ramey Shapiro episode. One way to implement
Christiano’s procedure is to compute two log linear equilibrium laws of motion
for the model corresponding to the pre and post 1973:2 periods. The diﬀerence
between the two is that the log linear approximation is computed about two
diﬀerent steady states of the model corresponding to the pre and post 1973:2
growth rate of technology. We approximate this procedure by computing one law
of motion around the steady state of the model assuming a growth rate of output,
γ = 1.005. This is equal to the average growth rate of output over the whole
sample period.
4.2. Model Calibration
In this subsection we brieﬂy describe how we calibrated the model’s parameter
values. We assume that a time period in the model corresponds to one quarter
and set β = 1.03−1/4. To evaluate the dependence of the model’s implications
on the Frisch labor supply elasticity we consider three values for µ.T h e ﬁrst,
µ = 0, corresponds to the Hansen-Rogerson inﬁnite elasticity case. The second,
µ = 1, implies the utility function for leisure is logarithmic. Combined with our
assumption that the representative agent spends 24 percent of his time endow-
ment working (see, for example, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)), this value
corresponds to a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 3.16. Finally, we consider µ = 10,
which corresponds to a Frisch labor supply elasticity of 0.33. As a reference point,
note that the value of the Frisch labor supply elasticity for males is estimated in
the labor literature to be close to zero (see Card (1991), Killingsworth (1983)
and Pencavel (1986)). Estimates of the Frisch labor supply elasticity for females
typically falls in the range 0.5t o1.5 (see for example, Heckman and Killingsworth
(1986)). The parameter η was set to imply that in nonstochastic steady state the
representative consumer spends 24% of his time endowment working. The rate of
depreciation on capital δ was set to 0.021 while α was set to 0.34 (see Christiano
19and Eichenbaum 1992).
Initially we set the habit formation and cost of adjustment parameters, b and
s to zero. We refer to this version of the model as the benchmark model.W et h e n
consider a version of the model, referred to as the modiﬁed benchmark model,
where b =0 .8a n ds =2 .0. This value of b is close to values used in the literature
(see for example Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001)). The value of s is close to
the value estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001).21 They show
that 1/s is the elasticity of investment with respect to a one percent temporary
increase in the price of installed capital.22 So a value of s equal to two implies
this this elasticity is equal to 0.5. We chose this value because it led to a better
performance of the model (see below).23
Interestingly, this parameterization does not lead to a deterioration of the
model’s performance for consumption and investment in a version of the model
driven only by technology shocks. To establish this we simulated the model as-
suming the only source of shocks was a multiplicative shock to the production
function. As in Hansen (1985) we assumed the shock was governed by a ﬁrst
order autoregressive process with autocorrelation coeﬃcient 0.95 and innovation
standard deviation equal to 0.00763. We logged and HP ﬁltered the data from
21Their point estimate of s is 3.60 with a standard error of 2.24.
22A more persistent change in the price of capital induces a larger percentage change in
investment. This is because adjustment costs induce agents to be forward looking. For example,
a permanent one-percent change in the price of capital induces a 1/[s(1 − β)] = 67 percent
change in investment.
23Interestingly, this parameterization does not lead to a deterioration of the model’s perfor-
mance for consumption and investment in a version of the model driven only by technology
shocks. To establish this we simulated the model assuming the only source of shocks was a
multiplicative shock to the production function. As in Hansen (1985) we assumed the shock
was governed by a ﬁrst order autoregressive process with autocorrelation coeﬃcient 0.95 and
innovation standard deviation equal to 0.00763. We logged and HP ﬁltered the data from the
model and calculated the standard deviation of consumption and investment relative to the
standard deviation of output. We found that consumption was 40 percent as volatile as output
and investment was 2.5 times as volatile as output. These model statistics are consistent with
the analogue statistics using US data (see for example, Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher 2001).
Evidently, along these dimensions our parameterization of habit formation and investment ad-
justment costs does not lead to counterfactual implications.
20the model and calculated the standard deviation of consumption and investment
relative to the standard deviation of output. We found that consumption was 40
percent as volatile as output and investment was 2.5 times as volatile as output.
These model statistics are consistent with the analogue statistics using US data
(see for example, Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher 2001). Evidently, along these
dimensions our parameterization of habit formation and investment adjustment
costs does not lead to counterfactual implications.
Our speciﬁcation for the jth coeﬃcient in the expansion of hi(L),i= 1,2,3i s
given by the estimated response of real government purchases, the capital income
tax rate and the labor income tax rate at t + j to the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro
episode at time t.I np r a c t i c ew eu s e5 0c o e ﬃcients in h1(L)a n d16c o e ﬃcients
in h2(L)a n dh3(L).24 W er e f e rt ot h i sa st h edistortionary tax speciﬁcation.W e
also consider a version of the model in which all taxes are lump sum. In this
speciﬁcation, h2(L)a n dh3(L) are set to zero. We refer to this as the lump sum
tax speciﬁcation.
4.3. Quantitative Implications of the Benchmark Model
We begin by considering the benchmark model in which there are no investment
adjustment costs (s = 0) and no habit formation (b = 0). Figure 3 displays the
dynamic response of hours worked, real wages, consumption and investment to a
ﬁscal shock. Columns 1 and 2 report results corresponding to the lump sum and
distortionary tax speciﬁcations, respectively. The dark solid lines in columns 1 and
2 display the estimated impulse response functions of hours worked, real wages,
investment and consumption. In the lump-sum tax case wages are before-tax. In
the distortionary tax case, wages are after-tax.25 The dotted lines correspond to
model based impulse response functions for µ = {0,1,10}. We start by analyzing
the implications of the model for hours worked and wages. We then turn to the
24T h e s ea r ed i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e2 .
25The estimated impulse response functions for the distortionary tax speciﬁcation are repro-
duced from Figure 2.
21behavior of consumption and investment to help assess the plausibility of the basic
mechanisms at work in our model.
4.3.1. The Response of Hours Worked
We initially consider the properties of hours worked in the lump sum tax speciﬁ-
cation of the model. First, notice that for all values of µ, the model generates a
prolonged rise in nt in response to a positive ﬁscal policy shock. This is because
an increase in Gt raises the present value of the household’s taxes and lowers its
permanent income. Since leisure is a normal good, equilibrium hours worked rises.
Second, when labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic (µ = 0), the model predicts a
strong positive response of hours worked. Indeed model based hours overshoot
relative to the data. For example, the peak responses of nt in the model and
the data are 13.2% and 9.7%, respectively. Hours worked responds less strongly
for lower elasticities of labor supply (higher values of µ). With a labor supply
elasticity of 3.16% (µ = 1)t h ep e a kr i s ei nnt in the model is about the same as
in the data. But when the labor supply elasticity equals 0.33 (µ = 10), the peak
rise in nt is only 2.6%, roughly 20% of the estimated peak response of nt in the
data.
The basic intuition for this result is as follows. The larger is µ t h em o r et h e
household wishes to smooth hours worked. Since hours worked do not change in
steady state, as µ becomes larger, the household ﬁnds it optimal to respond to a
rise in the present value of its taxes by reducing private consumption by relatively
more and varying hours worked less. Finally, notice that the hump-shaped rise
in nt becomes less pronounced for lower elasticities of labor supply. Again this
reﬂects the fact that the household is less willing to vary hours worked for higher
values of µ.
Turning to the distortionary tax speciﬁcation, a number of interesting results
are worth noting. First, for all values of µ, there is still a prolonged rise in nt. So
even after taking into account the rise in tax rates, the model can still account
qualitatively for the fact that an increase in government purchases leads to a boom
22in nt. As we discussed in the introduction, there is no a priori reason why this
must be the case. Our results indicate that the model’s qualitative implications
are robust to allowing for empirically plausible responses of tax rates.
Second, movements in distortionary tax rates do aﬀect the timing of how hours
worked respond to the ﬁscal policy shock. As can be seen from Figure 3, the key
diﬀerence relative to the lump sum tax speciﬁcation pertains to the shape of the
dynamic response function of nt. In the lump sum tax speciﬁcation, a ﬁscal shock
l e a d st oal o n gp e r s i s t e n tr i s ei nnt which slowly declines to its pre-shock level. For
µ = 1 and µ =0t h er i s ei nnt is hump-shaped with the maximal rise occurring
roughly one year after the shock. Once we allow for movements in distortionary
taxes, the rise in nt is shifted, counterfactually, closer to the time of the ﬁscal
shock. For all values of µ, t h ep e a kr i s ei nnt now occurs at the time of the ﬁscal
shock. The temporal shift in the response of nt is more pronounced the more
elastic is labor supply.
The intuition for this result can be described as follows. Other things equal, a
higher value of τnt gives rise to an intratemporal eﬀect which induces the household
to shift its period t allocation of time towards leisure. In addition the hump-shaped
pattern of the rise in τnt gives rise to an intertemporal eﬀect which induces the
household to shift nt towards periods in which τnt is relatively low. Since τnt
moves by relatively small amounts in the ﬁrst few periods after the ﬁscal shock,
the initial intratemporal eﬀects of the tax rate changes are small. Given the
intertemporal eﬀect of future rises in τnt, the initial rises in nt are slightly larger
than in the lump sum tax case. As marginal tax rates begin to rise signiﬁcantly,
the intratemporal eﬀect becomes quantitatively important and the responses of
nt in the lump sum and distortionary tax rate models become quite diﬀerent.
As Figure 3 indicates, the previous eﬀect is more pronounced the higher is the
elasticity of labor supply (the lower is µ). This is because the household is more
willing to intertemporally substitute nt o v e rt i m e .S ow h i l eah i g hl a b o rs u p p l y
elasticity often improves the empirical performance of neoclassical models, here it
hurts the model’s performance by exacerbating the swing in the peak response of
23hours towards the time of the shock.
We conclude this subsection by reporting the results of formally testing the
model’s ability to account for certain conditional moments of the data using the
J statistic deﬁn e di n( 9 ) .T h eﬁr s tm o m e n tt h a tw ec o n s i d e r ,σn,i st h es t a n d a r d
deviation of hours worked induced by the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode.
Below, σm
n and σd
n denote the values of this moment implied by the model and the
data, respectively.26 The other two moments that we consider, R1(n)a n dR2(n),
denote the average response of nt in period 1 through 4 and period 5 through
8 after a ﬁscal policy shock. We denote by Rm
i (n)a n dRd
i(n) the value of these
moments in the model and in the data, respectively. Model and data moments
were calculated using the ﬁrst sixteen coeﬃcients of the relevant dynamic response
function.





i (n)=0 ,i = 1,2. First consider the model’s implications for the
volatility of hours worked. Notice that the hypothesis that σd
n−σm
n =0c a n n o tb e
rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level. This true for all values of µ and for both tax
cases. Evidently the model does not have a problem accounting for the volatility
in hours worked induced by a ﬁscal shock.
Next consider the ability of the model to account for the average response
of hours worked in periods 1 through 4. From Table 1 we see that for both tax
speciﬁcations, when µ =0o r1, the model overstates the extent to which hours
worked rises. But when µ = 10, the model understates the extent to which hours
worked rises. Nevertheless, the only case in which the hypothesis Rd
1(n)−Rm
1 (n)=
0, can be rejected at more than the 1%s i g n i ﬁcance level, is the lump sum tax
- high labor supply elasticity speciﬁcation. In the empirically relevant case of
26We calculated these moments as follows. Let the actual and model implied dynamic response
function of a hours worked to a ﬁscal policy shock be given by ˆ H1
n(L)Dt and ˜ H1
n(L)Dt, respec-









n(i)]2}1/2, respectively. Here ˆ H1
n(i)a n d ˜ H1
n(i)d e n o t et h eith coeﬃcients in
the polynomial lag operators ˆ H1
n(L)a n d ˜ H1
n(L). In practice we calculated σm
n and σd
n using the
ﬁrst 16c o e ﬃcients of the relevant dynamic response functions.
24distortionary taxes, we cannot reject this hypothesis at even the 10% signiﬁcance
level when µ is equal to either 1 or 10.
We now turn to the average response of hours worked in periods 5 through
8. Consistent with our discussion above, allowing for movements in tax rates
considerably mutes the rise in hours worked in these time periods. For example
with µ = 1, the rise in hours worked with distortionary tax rates is only 65% as
large as in the lump sum tax case. As anticipated, the eﬀect of tax rate changes is
larger the higher is the elasticity of labor supply. Still, regardless of how we treat
taxes, the hypothesis Rd
2(n)−Rm
2 (n) = 0 cannot be rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance
level when µ i se q u a lt o0o r1.
We do not wish to overstate the overall ability of the benchmark model to
account for the dynamic response of hours worked. Figure 3 reveals that for both
tax speciﬁcations, the model has diﬃculty in accounting for the precise timing
of how nt responds to a ﬁscal policy shock. One way to make this precise is to
consider R1(n) − R2(n), the average response of nt during periods 1 − 4m i n u s
the average response during periods 5 − 8. In the data this diﬀerence is negative,
roughly −5.0 percentage points. In the lump sum tax speciﬁcation, Rm
1 (n)−Rm
2 (n)
is close to zero. Once we allow for movements in tax rates, Rm
1 (n) − Rm
2 (n)i s
actually positive. This reﬂects agents’ desire to work in periods when tax rates







1 (n) − Rm
2 (n)] = 0 at the 2% signiﬁcance level. Comparing
results across the lump sum and distortionary tax speciﬁcations, we see that
there is more evidence against the ability of the model to match the timing of the
response in hours worked in the latter case.
4.3.2. The Response of Real Wages
We now turn to the model’s implications for real wages. From Figure 3 we see
that all versions of the model are consistent with the qualitative response of real
25wages to the shock, namely they fall.27 This decline reﬂects the fact that hours
worked rises and the marginal product of labor is a decreasing function of nt.
Since the rise in nt is an increasing function of the elasticity of labor supply, real
wages fall by more the higher is that elasticity.
Interestingly, the model also does well at accounting for the quantitative re-
sponse of real wages. Table 2 summarizes the results of formally testing the analog
hypotheses to those reported in Table 1.T h eﬁrst moment, σw,i st h es t a n d a r d
deviation of the real wage induced by the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro shock. In the
lump sum and distortionary tax cases, the real wage measure pertains to before
and after-tax real wages, respectively. The other two moments that we consider,
R1(w)a n dR2(w) denote the average response of wt in period 1 through 4 and
period 5 through 8 after a ﬁscal policy shock.
Two features of Table 2 stand out. First, in the distortionary tax case, there
is very little evidence against any of the hypotheses that we consider. Second,
there is some evidence against the low labor supply elasticity version of the model
(µ = 10) in the lump sum tax case.28
We conclude that regardless of whether or not we allow for movements in dis-
tortionary tax rates, our simple benchmark neoclassical model is able to account
for the qualitative eﬀects of a ﬁscal policy shock on hours worked and real wages.
The empirically relevant case is the one in which labor and capital income tax
rates rise after an exogenous shock to government purchases. Here the model does
quite well at accounting quantitatively for the dynamic response of real wages.
The model also does reasonably well at accounting for the volatility and peak
response of hours worked. But it has diﬃculty in accounting for the timing of the
response of hours worked.
27The estimated declines in after tax real wages are larger than those of before tax real wages.
This is because the former reﬂect both rises in τnt and declines in wt.
28For example the hypothesis that σd
w − σm
w = 0 can be rejected at the 2% signiﬁcance level.
Also the hypothesis that Rd
2(w)−Rm
2 (w) = 0 can be rejected at the 1%s i g n i ﬁcance level. In part
the diﬀerence between the test statistics for the lump sum and distortionary tax cases reﬂect
the sampling uncertainty in the response of model based real wages induced by the sampling
uncertainty associated with our estimate of how tax rates respond to a ﬁscal policy shock.
264.3.3. The Response of Consumption and Investment
We now consider the model’s ability to account for the dynamic responses of
consumption and investment. Figure 3 indicates that model based consumption
drops in response to the ﬁscal policy shock. This is true for all values of µ and
regardless of which tax case we consider. The drop in consumption reﬂects the
negative wealth eﬀect associated with the rise in government spending. The size
of the drop is larger the smaller is the elasticity of labor supply (the higher is µ).
This reﬂects agents’ greater reluctance to pay for the rise in the present value of
taxes by varying hours worked, rather than reducing consumption. But for all
values of µ the model substantially overstates the fall in consumption.
Figure 3 also indicates that in all cases the model generates a very sharp rise
in investment after a ﬁscal policy shock. The intuition for this is seen most easily
by considering the case of a permanent rise in government purchases ﬁnanced via
lump sum taxes. In that case the steady state value of hours worked rises. Given
our other assumptions, the steady state value of the capital - labor ratio does not
change, so that steady state capital must rise. To build up the higher steady state
stock of capital, actual investment must initially exceed its new, higher steady
state value. The same basic forces apply in the face of a persistent, but not
permanent, increase in government purchases. The household must work harder
for a number of time periods to pay its larger tax bill. Since hours worked and
capital are complements, the household initially increases investment in response
to the shock. Figure 3 reveals that allowing for distortionary taxes has a relatively
small aﬀect on the quantitative response of consumption and investment. But as
with consumption, the model dramatically overstate the extent of the rise in
investment.
Table 3 and 4, which pertain to investment and consumption, respectively,
summarize the results of formally testing the analogous hypotheses to those re-
p o r t e di nT a b l e1. The moments, σc and σI, are the standard deviations of
consumption and investment induced by the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro shock.
The other moments that we consider, R1(z)a n dR2(z),z ∈ {C,I} denote the
27average response of zt in period 1 through 4 and period 5 through 8 after a ﬁscal
policy shock.
A number of key results emerge here. First, the model clearly overstates the
volatility of consumption and investment. In all but one case we can reject the
hypotheses that σd
I − σm
I =0a n dσd
c − σm
c =0a tt h e1%s i g n i ﬁcance level. The
exception is the case of lump sum taxes with µ = 1. Even here the hypothesis
can be rejected at the 3% signiﬁcance level. Second, there is very strong evidence
against the other hypotheses involving the dynamic responses of consumption and
investment.
In sum, we have shown that the benchmark model does well at accounting
for the qualitative responses of the hours worked, real wages, investment and to
a lesser extent consumption. But the model clearly has diﬃculty accounting for
the timing of the response in hours worked and the magnitude of the responses of
consumption and investment. In the next section we argue that these shortcoming
are related and can be substantially improved upon by allowing for habit formation
and investment adjustment costs.
4.4. Properties of the Modiﬁed Benchmark Model
In this subsection we discuss the quantitative properties of the model when we
allow for habit formation and investment adjustment costs (b =0 .80,s=2 ) .F o r
the sake of parsimony we focus on the high labor supply (µ = 0), distortionary
t a xc a s ev e r s i o no ft h em o d e l .F i g u r e4d i s p l a y st h ed y n a m i cr e s p o n s e so fm o d e l
based hours worked, real wages, consumption and investment to a ﬁscal shock for
three sets of parameter values: (b =0 .80,s=2 ) , (b =0 .80,s=0 ) ,(b =0 ,s=2 ) .
The latter two speciﬁcations allow us to disentangle the roles played by habit
formation and investment adjustment costs, per se. For convenience the Figure
also reports the estimated impulse response functions along with shaded regions
corresponding to 95% conﬁdence interval bands.
Consider our results when we allow for both habit persistence and investment
adjustment costs. First, the model does a much better job of accounting for the
28estimated response of investment. In the simple benchmark model, investment
jumps in the impact period of the ﬁscal shock, substantially overstating the actual
response of investment. In the presence of adjustment costs, investment rises in a
hump shaped manner, with the average response over the ﬁrst year being similar
to that observed in the data. Figure 4 reveals that if we set adjustment costs
to zero, but retained habit formation, investment behaves much as in the simple
benchmark model.
Second, the model does a better, if still imperfect job of accounting for the re-
sponse of consumption. In the simple benchmark model, the drop in consumption
was substantially larger than that observed in the data. The presence of habit for-
mation mutes the decline in consumption, although not enough to closely mimic
our point estimates. Figure 4 reveals that if we set habit formation to zero,
but retain investment adjustment costs, the performance of the model regarding
consumption deteriorates markedly.
Third, the model does much better at matching the timing of the response
of hours worked which now rise in a pronounced hump shaped way with the
peak response occurring over a year after the onset of the ﬁscal shock. The key
reason for this is the presence of investment adjustment costs. Movements in tax
rates aside, the household wants to worker harder because of the negative wealth
eﬀects associated with the rise in government spending. It pays to work harder in
periods when the household can use part of its wages to build up the capital stock.
Because of the adjustment costs, it is optimal to build up investment rates and
hours worked slowly in a hump shaped way. Figure 4 reveals that the performance
of the model with respect to hours worked deteriorates markedly if we retain habit
formation in consumption but abandon the assumption of investment adjustment
costs. Fourth, mirroring the response of hours worked, after tax real wages also
fall in a hump shaped manner.
The last columns of Tables 1 through 4 report the results of formally testing the
ability of the model to account for various moments of the data. Table 1 reveals
that there is now very little evidence against the model involving hypotheses about
29hours worked. Recall that the simple benchmark model had diﬃculty accounting
for the timing of the response of hours worked. Table 1 indicates that the modiﬁed
model does not have this problem. Table 2 reveals some marginal evidence against
hypotheses involving after tax real wages. But none are rejected at marginal
signiﬁcance rates smaller than 5%.
Table 3 reveals a dramatic improvement in the model’s performance regarding
investment. Recall that in the simple benchmark model, there was very strong
evidence against most of the hypotheses involving investment. Table 4 reveals
that there is virtually no evidence against these hypotheses once we allow for
investment adjustment costs.
Finally, Table 4 reveals a marked improvement in the model’s performance
regarding consumption. In the simple benchmark model with the distortionary
tax speciﬁcation, every hypothesis involving consumption was overwhelmingly
rejected. Now only the hypothesis that σd
c − σm
c = 0 can be rejected at roughly
the 1%s i g n i ﬁcance level. None of the other hypotheses can be rejected at more
than the 5% signiﬁcance level. Much stronger evidence against the model emerges
if we retain investment adjustment costs but do not allow for habit formation in
consumption.
We conclude that allowing for habit formation and investment adjustment
costs alleviates the salient quantitative shortcomings of the benchmark model.
The high labor supply elasticity version of the modiﬁed model does a good job
of accounting for both the qualitative and quantitative eﬀects of a ﬁscal policy
shock. This is true even though we allow for movements in distortionary tax rates.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigated the eﬀects of a ﬁscal policy shock on key macroeconomic
aggregates. An important feature of our analysis is that we explicitly allow for
movements in capital and labor tax rates as well as government purchases. Using
post war US data, we identify ﬁscal policy shocks that are followed by persistent
30declines in real wages and rises in tax rates, government purchases, and hours
worked. They are also associated with a short lived rise in investment and small
movements in consumption. We assess whether a neoclassical model can account
for these ﬁndings.
Our main results are as follows. First, a benchmark version of the model
can account for the qualitative eﬀects of a ﬁscal shock on both hours worked, real
wages, consumption and investment. However this simple version of the model has
important shortcomings. Speciﬁcally it has diﬃculty accounting for the timing of
how hours responds. This is because movements in distortionary tax rates shift
the rise in employment counterfactually, closer to the time of the ﬁscal shock. In
addition, the benchmark model overstates the rise in investment and the drop in
consumption that follow a ﬁscal policy shock.
Second, incorporating habit formation in consumption and investment adjust-
ment costs into the model considerably enhances its quantitative performance.
Indeed we ﬁnd relatively little formal evidence against the model, at least for the
hypotheses that we consider. The model has two important shortcomings. First,
the most successful version of the model assumes an elasticity of labor supply
that is high relative to the micro evidence. Second, even the model with habit
formation overstates the decline in consumption that occurs after a ﬁscal shock. It
is possible that a model which allowed for endogenous capacity utilization would
lead to a larger rise in output and smaller decline in consumption than the model
considered in this paper (see, for example, Burnside and Eichenbaum 1996). De-
spite these shortcomings, we conclude that our modiﬁed neoclassical model does
a reasonably good job at accounting for the qualitative and quantitative eﬀects
of a shock to ﬁscal policy on key macro aggregates.
316. Data Appendix
Below we list the data series used in our analysis. All series are seasonally adjusted
except for taxes and population. The Haver database mnemonic for the series is
indicated where appropriate.
1. Expenditures. Output (GDPH), Defense spending (GFDH), Government
purchases (Defense spending plus Federal, State and Local consumption ex-
penditures, GFDH+GFNEH+GSEH), Consumption (Consumption of non-
durables and services, CNH+CNS, plus the service ﬂow from consumer
durables, obtained from David Reifschneider of the Federal Reserve Board),
Investment (Federal Non-defense investment plus State and Local invest-
ment plus consumer durables expenditures plus private ﬁxed investment,
GNIH+GSIH+CDH+FH). When series are added together they are chain
weighted. This requires the nominal version of the series listed above (mnemon-
ics for these series are the same as for the real series with the last letter
removed.) All real series are in units of 1996 chain-weighted dollars. To
deﬂate nominal compensation we use the price index associated with our
measure of real consumption.
2. Labor Market. Hours (index of hours of all persons in the non-farm busi-
ness sector, LXNFH), real wages (index of compensation to persons in the
non-farm business sector, LXNFC, deﬂated by our price index), population
(resident population, POP).
3. Taxes. For details of how Jones calculates average labor and capital taxes,
see Appendix B to Jones (2002). Jones measures of capital and labor taxes
extend from 1958 onward. To derive series extending back to 1947:I we splice
his post-1958 series to closely related series we derive for the period 1947:I
to 1957:IV. Our pre-1958 series are calculated as follows. First we calculate
an alternative to the average personal income tax measure employed by
Jones. His personal income tax is based on the sum of state, local and
32federal income taxes. These are not available prior to 1958 and so we use
the measure of total personal taxes (Survey of Current Business Table 3.1
line 2) which includes government fees such as marriage licences. Except
for this diﬀerence, the inputs into our labor tax measure are identical to
the ones Jones uses for post 1958. The resulting measure is very similar
to Jones’ labor tax in the period where both can be calculated. Their
correlation over the period 1958:I to 1996:IV is 0.9996. We splice Jones post-
1958 labor tax to our pre-1958 labor tax by accumulating changes in our
measure backwards from 1958:I. Our pre-1958 capital tax measure also uses
our alternative version of the average personal income tax. The only other
diﬀerence with Jones’ post-1958 capital tax measure is that our’s excludes
property taxes, which are not available prior to 1958. The dynamics of our
capital tax are very similar to Jones’ capital tax measure in the period in
which they both can be calculated. Their correlation over the period 1958:I
to 1996:IV is 0.9490. We splice Jones post-1958 capital tax to our pre-1958
c a p i t a lt a xi nt h es a m ew a yw es p l i c et h el a b o rt a xs e r i e s .
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36Table 1. Goodness-of-ﬁt Tests for the Response of Hours Worked
Lump Sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes
b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 .8 b =0 .8
s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =2 s =0 s =2
Moment µ =0 µ =1 µ =1 0 µ =0 µ =1 µ =1 0 µ =0 µ =0 µ =0
Standard Deviation
Data 30.90 30.90 30.90 30.90 30.90 30.90 30.90 30.90 30.90
Model 46.70 33.01 9.40 32.77 23.54 6.98 30.13 48.11 45.40
J-statistic 0.98 0.02 2.99 0.01 0.21 3.61 0.003 1.04 0.77
P-value 0.32 0.88 0.08 0.92 0.64 0.06 0.96 0.31 0.38
Average 1,2,3,4
Data 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14
Model 12.20 8.70 2.48 12.28 8.23 2.23 3.70 15.24 4.68
J-statistic 10.07 5.17 0.16 5.03 2.40 0.26 0.08 9.81 0.47
P-value <0.01 0.02 0.69 0.02 0.12 0.61 0.78 <0.01 0.49
Average 5,6,7,8
Data 8.48 8.48 8.48 8.48 8.48 8.48 8.48 8.48 8.48
Model 12.98 9.04 2.52 8.14 5.92 1.77 9.23 12.13 13.70
J-statistic 1.15 0.02 3.19 0.004 0.29 3.85 0.03 0.61 1.33
P-value 0.28 0.89 0.07 0.95 0.59 0.05 0.86 0.43 0.25
Average 1,2,3,4 less 5,6,7,8
Data -5.34 -5.34 -5.34 -5.34 -5.34 -5.34 -5.34 -5.34 -5.34
Model -0.78 -0.33 -0.05 4.15 2.32 0.46 -5.53 3.11 -9.03
J-statistic 3.59 4.35 4.86 12.80 9.67 5.85 0.005 7.44 1.58
P-value 0.06 0.04 0.03 <0.01 <0.01 0.02 0.95 <0.01 0.21
Note: Based on the estimated VAR system including the variables: output, average capital taxes, average labor taxes, govern-
ment spending on goods and services, and hours worked in the non-farm business sector. In the lump-sum case the real wages
are before tax and in the distortionary tax case they are after tax.Table 2. Goodness-of-ﬁt Tests for the Response of Real Wages
Lump Sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes
b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 .8 b =0 .8
s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =2 s =0 s =2
Moment µ =0 µ =1 µ =1 0 µ =0 µ =1 µ =1 0 µ =0 µ =0 µ =0
Standard Deviation
Data 16.47 16.44 16.44 23.89 23.89 23.89 23.89 23.89 23.89
Model 9.85 7.25 3.60 13.90 12.83 10.76 17.24 18.76 21.13
J-statistic 1.20 2.56 5.61 1.10 1.15 1.28 1.09 0.62 0.18
P-value 0.27 0.11 0.02 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.43 0.68
Average 1,2,3,4
Data -2.82 -2.82 -2.82 -3.19 -3.19 -3.19 -3.19 -3.19 -3.19
Model -3.11 -2.10 -0.37 -3.34 -2.26 -0.68 -1.23 -4.18 -1.42
J-statistic 0.05 0.33 4.83 0.01 0.24 1.05 4.96 0.61 3.77
P-value 0.83 0.56 0.03 0.93 0.63 0.31 0.03 0.43 0.05
Average 5,6,7,8
Data -3.68 -3.68 -3.68 -6.24 -6.24 -6.24 -6.24 -6.24 -6.24
Model -2.59 -1.68 -0.25 -3.52 -3.30 -2.63 -5.11 -4.86 -6.35
J-statistic 0.53 1.94 6.43 0.94 0.89 0.96 0.55 0.75 0.005
P-value 0.47 0.16 0.01 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.46 0.39 0.94
Average 1,2,3,4 less 5,6,7,8
Data 0.87 0.87 0.87 3.06 3.06 3.06 3.06 3.06 3.06
Model -0.52 -0.42 -0.13 0.19 1.04 1.96 3.88 0.68 4.93
J-statistic 1.01 0.86 0.52 3.85 1.76 0.52 0.73 3.30 3.53
P-value 0.31 0.35 0.47 0.05 0.18 0.47 0.39 0.07 0.06
Note: Based on the estimated VAR system including the variables: output, average capital taxes, average labor taxes, govern-
ment spending on goods and services, and nominal labor compensation in the non-farm business sector deﬂated by the price
index corresponding to our measure of consumption. In the lump-sum case the real wages are before tax and in the distortionary
tax case they are after tax.T able 3. Goodness-of- ﬁ t T e sts fo r the Re sponse of In v es tm en t
Lump Sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes
b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 .8 b =0 .8
s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =2 s =0 s =2
Moment µ =0 µ =1 µ =1 0 µ =0 µ =1 µ =1 0 µ =0 µ =0 µ =0
Standard Deviation
Data 16.53 16.53 16.53 16.53 16.53 16.53 16.53 16.53 16.53
Model 76.02 65.79 69.95 115.12 91.98 79.49 33.14 101.09 32.09
J-statistic 21.21 14.55 17.11 58.27 34.12 23.76 0.76 16.06 0.71
P-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.38 <0.01 0.40
Average 1,2,3,4
Data 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41
Model 35.33 31.01 22.68 35.67 28.79 19.73 5.53 37.70 8.28
J-statistic 69.20 51.22 24.15 70.74 43.02 16.98 0.05 13.62 0.60
P-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.82 <0.01 0.44
Average 5,6,7,8
Data 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08
Model 11.67 4.21 -8.79 -6.61 -8.84 -13.79 -2.54 -4.87 -0.85
J-statistic 1.78 0.09 2.29 1.46 2.31 4.88 0.25 0.40 0.10
P-value 0.18 0.77 0.13 0.23 0.13 0.03 0.62 0.53 0.75
Average 1,2,3,4 less 5,6,7,8
Data 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.32
Model 23.66 26.80 31.47 42.28 37.63 33.51 8.07 42.57 9.13
J-statistic 17.40 22.92 32.48 61.06 47.67 37.20 0.96 31.41 1.37
P-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.33 <0.01 0.24
Note: Based on the estimated VAR system including the variables: output, average capital taxes, average labor taxes, govern-
ment spending on goods and services, and real private ﬁxed investment plus consumption of durables.T able 4. Goodness -of -ﬁ t T ests fo r the Response o f Consumption
Lump Sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes
b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 b =0 .8 b =0 .8
s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =0 s =2 s =0 s =2
Moment µ =0 µ =1 µ =1 0 µ =0 µ =1 µ =1 0 µ =0 µ =0 µ =0
Standard Deviation
Data 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53
Model 20.70 29.09 44.75 26.72 33.04 45.48 31.84 14.71 17.73
J-statistic 4.93 7.01 8.43 16.30 13.77 8.88 15.48 3.85 6.48
P-value 0.03 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.05 0.01
Average 1,2,3,4
Data -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32
Model -3.31 -5.09 -8.37 -3.63 -5.18 -7.94 -1.75 -2.04 -1.88
J-statistic 6.57 9.60 10.69 11.26 11.01 7.73 2.15 2.74 2.48
P-value 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.14 0.09 0.12
Average 5,6,7,8
Data -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
Model -5.75 -7.85 -11.70 -6.99 -8.65 -11.78 -8.69 -3.73 -4.50
J-statistic 4.90 7.02 9.02 9.13 10.02 8.74 11.79 2.29 3.47
P-value 0.03 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.13 0.06
Average 1,2,3,4 less 5,6,7,8
Data -0.27 -0.27 -0.2654 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27
Model 2.44 2.76 3.3252 3.35 3.46 3.84 6.94 1.69 2.62
J-statistic 2.94 3.51 4.4385 5.99 6.11 6.53 17.58 1.56 3.42
P-value 0.09 0.06 0.0351 0.01 0.01 0.01 <0.01 0.21 0.06
Note: Based on the estimated VAR system including the variables: output, average capital taxes, average labor taxes, govern-
ment spending on goods and services, and real consumption of nondurables and services plus the service ﬂow from consumer
durables.Real Defence Spending
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